The University of San Francisco

USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Philosophy

College of Arts and Sciences

2012

Attraction and Repulsion: Understanding
Aristotle’s Poiein and Paschein
Marjolein Oele
University of San Francisco, moele@usfca.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/phil
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Oele, Marjolein, "Attraction and Repulsion: Understanding Aristotle’s Poiein and Paschein" (2012). Philosophy. Paper 19.
http://repository.usfca.edu/phil/19

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson
Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.

Attraction and Repulsion: Understanding Aristotle’s Poiein and Paschein
Submission for Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal
December 6, 2010
Introduction
Philosophical scholarship in the 20th and 21st centuries has shown a renewed interest in
the concepts of motion and activity. Within Aristotle scholarship, this renewed interest has led to
a surge in studies examining concepts such as physis,1 kinēsis,2 dynamis and energeia.3 Although
these concepts are indeed pivotal to Aristotle‘s thinking, it is surprising that other concepts,
which equally express motion and activity,4 have received much less attention. Two terms have
been especially neglected: the correlated concepts of ―acting‖ (poiein) and ―being acted upon‖
(paschein).5
There are several reasons why this failure to attend to poiein and paschein is unjustified
and, in fact, constitutes scholarly neglect that needs to be rectified. First, these concepts emerge
at pivotal places in Aristotle‘s oeuvre: poiein and paschein are two of the ten categories pertinent
to grasping the ultimate referents of linguistics, semantics, and metaphysics. Secondly, they play
an important role in helping one understand the principles that rule processes such as generation

1

Cf. S. Waterlow, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics: A Philosophical Study, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1982 and H.S. Lang, The Order of Nature in Aristotle’s Physics: Place and the Elements, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
2
Cf. L.A. Kosman, ―Aristotle‘s Definition of Motion,‖ in: Phronesis: A Journal of Ancient Philosophy 14, 1969, pp.
40-62; D. W. Graham, ―States and Performances: Aristotle‘s Test,‖ in: Philosophical Quarterly 30, 1980, pp. 117130; D.W. Graham, ―Aristotle‘s Definition of Motion,‖ in: Ancient Philosophy 8, fall 1988, pp. 209-215.
3
Cf. J. Stallmach, Dynamis und energeia; Untersuchungen am Werk des Aristoteles zur Problemgeschichte von
Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain, 1959.
4
Our paper examines the general notion of motion and activity, including both kinēsis and energeia. For this reason
we will speak both of ―motion‖ and ―activity.‖ We will explicate this further in section 2 (b) of this paper.
5
In our view, by translating poiein as ―acting‖ and paschein as ―being acted upon,‖ we can do justice to the
relationship between the two terms, as it allows us to hear both the active voice associated with poiein in Attic Greek
and the passive voice associated with paschein; for a further elaboration of the active and the passive voice, see the
first section of our paper. However, since even such a provisional translation of poiein as ―acting‖ and paschein as
―being acted upon‖ could interfere with grasping the full meaning of these two terms, we will mostly use
transliterations of these terms.

1

and corruption in the sublunary world.6 Moreover, their importance increases when it is realized
that Aristotle appears to have devoted a whole book to the concepts of poiein and paschein, as
Diogenes Laertius testifies.7
Yet, what exactly is the significance of poiein and paschein: what kind of motion or
activity do these two notions designate? This question is closely intertwined with an inquiry into
the relationship between these two concepts, since they are often mentioned together and used as
correlatives. Thus, our inquiry into the meaning of poiein and paschein needs to ask the
important question of why there are two categories and not one to designate motion or activity.
Although this question is hardly new – it has already been raised by Plotinus,8 among others – it
has largely been forgotten, and its importance has been overlooked. Our paper seeks to revive the
question of why there are two categories rather than one, and offers a new solution.
Our main thesis is that the relationship between poiein and paschein involves a dynamic
of attraction and repulsion, which explains both their identification with and distinction from
each other. We speak of attraction since the two concepts at times appear to be so correlated that
they almost collapse into one another as if they formed one concept. At other times, however,
poiein and paschein appear to be opposed as two utterly distinct ideas (signifying ‗active‘ and

6

Cf. the title of Burnyeat‘s essay ―Aristotle on the Foundations of Sublunary Physics,‖ which serves as an
introduction to the collection of essays edited by F. de Haas and J. Mansfeld: Aristotle’s On Generation and
Corruption I, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. In his essay, Burnyeat addresses how On Generation and Corruption
discusses foundations on different levels: physical, conceptual, and teleological (pp.13-24). Cf. also Mueller, who
speaks of GC as ―a presentation of the general principles for studying the features of the sublunar world‖ (Notre
Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005-06-17).
7
According to Diogenes Laertius, the title of this (now lost) work is: ―perˆ toà p£scein À peponqšnai.” Diogenes
Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers V.22, translated by R.D. Hicks (London: Heinemann) 1925. Cf. also A.
Trendelenburg, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1864 [1963], p.
131. The latter speaks, however, about ―perˆ toà poie‹n kaˆ peponqšnai.‖ The fact that ―perˆ toà p£scein À
peponqšnai” has been catalogued by Diogenes Laertius among Aristotle‘s logical works leads Moraux to suggest
that this work consisted of an examination of paschein as ―one of the categories of being‖ (P. Moraux. Les listes
anciennes des ouvrages d’Aristote, Louvain: Éditions Universitaires de Louvain, 1951, p. 46).
8
Cf. Plotinus, Enneads VI.1.11 and VI. 3.28. Plotinus, Enneads, with an English translation by A.H. Armstrong,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.
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‗passive‘ causality respectively), and thereby seem to repulse each other. Aristotle‘s refusal to
collapse poiein and paschein into one another while simultaneously showing their correlation
demonstrates his acknowledgement of the dynamic that is at the heart of motion or activity: an
irresolvable tension between an ‗active‘ and ‗passive‘ factor that both attract and repulse each
another.
In the following, we will first explore the meaning of poiein and paschein in the
Categories and On Generation and Corruption. Subsequently, we will first offer proof to suggest
that poiein and paschein can be unified in one concept, and then arguments demonstrating the
need for their separation. Ultimately, this will lead us to the conclusion that poiein and paschein
are caught in a dynamic between attraction and repulsion, caused by mutual dependence and
irrevocable difference.

1. Poiein and paschein as correlated categories and as contrary principles of physical
change

In the Categories, Aristotle lists poiein and paschein as two of the ten categories:

Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance (oÙs…a) or
quantity (posÕn) or qualification (poiÕn) or relation (prÒj ti) or where (poà) or when
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(pot•) or being-in-a-position (ke‹sqai) or having (œcein) or acting (poie‹n) or being
acted upon (p£scein) (Categories 4, 1b25-1b28).9

The linguistic morphology10 of poiein and paschein unlocks their meaning. In contrast to the
other eight categories that are all expressed in ―static‖ terms (such as nouns, adverbs, or
interrogatives), poiein and paschein are grammatically expressed in ―dynamic‖11 terms, i.e., as
verbal infinitives.12 Their morphology emphasizes that poiein and paschein are referents for the
verbal constituents of sentences. From a semantic perspective, this means that poiein and
paschein denote motions or activities. What distinguishes poiein and paschein is their voice:
―cuts‖ or ―walks‖ are verbs designating motions expressed in the active voice13 to be categorized
as poiein; in contrast, ―being cut‖ or ―being walked‖ are in the passive voice,14 illustrating
paschein.
The recognition of the difference between the active and passive voice is important, since
it implies that Aristotle is sensitive to the various directions that motions and activities can take.
In other words, there is a difference in meaning at the very root of every motion and activity. This

9

We have modified Ackrill‘s translation. Cf. Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione, translated by J.L. Ackrill,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.
10
The grammatical expressions Aristotle employs to denote the various categories are ―grammatically
heterogeneous‖ (Ackrill,1963, p. 78).
11
Cf. H. Bonitz, Über die Kategorien des Aristoteles, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1853 [1967]
p. 57.
12
This is something which they share with the categories of being-in-a-position (ke‹sqai) and having (œcein).
However, since these latter two are missing in Aristotle‘s other discussions of the categories (except in the Topics),
we will not elaborate upon them here. For a discussion of keisthai and echein, cf. p. 24 of Trendelenburg‘s
Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1864 [1963], where he discusses
the specific grammatical form of these two categories. Keisthai partly refers to intransitive uses of the infinitive, and
echein partly refers to the Greek perfect, since – as the examples indicate – it refers to ―a possession of an activity.‖
Ackrill notes that these verbal infinitives ―can be used as a verbal noun‖ (Ackrill, 1963, p.78).
13
The active voice ―represents the subject as performing the action of the verb.‖ The example Smyth gives is loÚw I
wash.‖ See H.W. Smyth, Greek Grammar, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984, § 1703, p. 389.
14
The passive voice ―represents the subject as acted on.‖ Smyth mentions as examples ™wqoànto (they were pushed)
and ™pa…onto (they were struck). Smyth, 1984, § 1735, p. 394.
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difference is categorized as ―doing‖ or ―acting‖ in the most general sense of poiein15 in contrast
to that of its antonym, paschein, which captures the most general sense of ―being done to,‖ or
―being acted upon.‖16 What is remarkable is that, although poiein and paschein are different, they
are dependent upon each other as well: as antonyms they cannot be grasped without referring to
each other.
The antonymical and correlated character of poiein and paschein also appears in another
work that devotes special attention to these two concepts: On Generation and Corruption.
Aristotle argues here that poiein and paschein are explanatory of the reciprocal processes that
take place between qualitative contraries (GC I.7, 323b30-324a5) such as hot and cold, and wet
and dry. These processes account for the generation and corruption of the ―primary bodies‖ (ta
prwt© sèmata, GC II.3 330b7 or t¦ ¡pl© sèmata, GC II.3 330b8) and what his predecessors
called ―elements‖ – i.e. water, fire, air, and earth.17
By making use of poiein and paschein as explanations for the reciprocal processes taking
place between contraries, Aristotle shows that contrariety is vital to the relationship between
these two notions. Notably, Aristotle states that agent (to poioun) and patient (to paschon) are
contraries (GC I.6, 323b30-324a9) and he uses the language of ―opposition‖ (¢ntiq»somen, GC
I.6, 323a18) when referring to poiein and paschein. In combination with our reading of poiein
and paschein as correlated categories designating active and passive motion respectively, this

15

Cf. Trendelenburg, 1863, p. 137. Poiein, as Liddell and Scott illustrate, has in Attic Greek an extensive field of
meaning, denoting doing and making in various varieties (Liddell and Scott, 1980, pp. 1427-9.). Hence, it is better
suited for usage in a generic sense than other verbs that denote action, such as prattein. Poiein in this broad sense
should not be confused with Aristotle‘s use of this term in the Nicomachean Ethics. There, Aristotle uses the term in
a much more limited sense, i.e., that of ―instrumental doing‖ or ―making.‖ It is then contrasted with prattein, an
activity that is an end in itself. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI.2 1139b1-4, VI.4 1140a1-23; see also Aristotle‘s
Magna Moralia 35, 119713-13.
16
Cf. Trendelenburg, 1864, p. 137. Instead of using poiesthai, Aristotle resorts to pascho to express the passive
voice. This is in line with its common usage in the Attic Greek language: Cf. Liddell and Scott, Greek-English
Lexicon, revised and augmented by H.S. Jones, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1983, p.1347.
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leaves us to wonder about the status of poiein and paschein: are they truly two separate concepts
or are they to be grasped similarly to Aristotle‘s comprehension of contraries, i.e. as ―being
different in species, but similar in genus‖ (GC I.7, 323b30-34)?18 If they are merely antonyms,
correlatives and contraries, we have sufficient reason to assign poiein and paschein to one single
category, instead of allocating them their own categories. Of course, this then raises the issue: to
what category could we reduce poiein and paschein? In the following we will examine two
options: (a) poiein and paschein as unified in the genus of relation (pros ti) and (b) poiein and
paschein as unified in the genus of motion or activity broadly speaking.19

2 (a) Unification: poiein, paschein and the genus of relation (pros ti)
In his Enneads, Plotinus20 suggests that poiein and paschein can be embraced under a
single heading. In his view, poiein and paschein are to be consigned to the category of relation:
―both are relation (pros ti), in all cases where action (poiein) is related to passive affection
(paschein); if one looks at the same on one side it is action (poiein), but if on the other, it is
affection (paschein)‖ (VI.1.22). Underlying his suggestion is the idea that one and the same
process can be interpreted or looked at in two ways, either in terms of poiein or in terms of
paschein. One process – for example heating – can be looked at from the perspective of the
heating source, and then called ―heating.‖ When looked upon from the perspective of the cold

17

In other words, ―elements,‖ are, in fact, composites. Aristotle‘s term in GC II.3, 330b22-23 is ―mixed‖ (miktÒn).
Wildberg speaks pointedly of ―similarity in difference.‖ Wildberg, 2004, p. 231.
19
Other options to grasp poiein and paschein under one genus may be suggested as well. Ammonius distinguishes
four principal and primary categories: substance, quantity, quality, and relative, and suggests that poiein and
paschein can be grasped as a result of the mingling of the primary categories of substance and quality. Cf.
Ammonius, On Aristotle’s Categories, translated by S.M. Cohen & G.B. Matthews, London: Duckworth, 1991, 92,
6-11. Following Ammonius‘ lead, we could thus plead to subordinate poiein and paschein to the category of
―qualification‖ (poiÕn), which could be justified on the basis of their constant association with qualitative change in
GC.
18
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water being heated however, we could equally call it ―being heated.‖ Heating and being heated
are ultimately correlated, as the meaning of ―heating‖ is not complete without referring to
something ―being heated.‖ Therefore, acting (poiein) and being acted upon (paschein) are, in the
end, to be unified in a genus that shows their codependence upon each other: relation.21
Plotinus‘ proposal finds further evidence in Metaphysics V.15, where Aristotle
characterizes ―that which can act‖ (poihtikÕn) and ―that which can be acted upon‖ (paqhtikÕn)
as expressions signifying relatives: 22

Some things are said to be relative (prÕj ti) in the way that double is relative to half or
triple to one-third, or generally the multiple to what is one of many parts, or what exceeds
to what is exceeded; others are meant in the way that what can heat (qermantikÕn) is
relative to what can be heated (qermantÕn), or what can cut (tmhtikÕn) to what can be
cut (tmhtÕn), and generally what is active (poihtikÕn) to what is passive (paqhtikÕn)
(Metaphysics V.15, 1020b26-30).23

Equally telling is Physics III.1:

Being in relation to something (prÕj ti) is attributed to what exceeds or falls short, or to
what acts (poihtikÕn) and what is acted upon (paqhtikÕn), or generally (Ólwj) to what

20

Plotinus was presumably not the first one to make this suggestion; before the time of Boethus this issue had
already been debated. Cf. S. Strange, 1992, footnote 504.
21
For a similar but modern view on the categories of poiein and paschein, we may invoke Kant, who finds action
and passion ―derivative concepts,‖ and who lists reciprocity between agent and patient as belonging within the group
of relation. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N. Kemp Smith, New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1929
[1965], B 106 ff.
22
Apostle, 1980, p. 87.
23
Sachs‘ translation, with some modifications. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Santa Fe: Green Lion Press, 1999.
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moves (kinhtikÕn) and what is moved (kinhtÕn): for what moves is a mover of
something moved (tÕ g¦r kinhtÕn kinhtÕn toà kinhtoà), and what is moved is moved
by something moving it (kaˆ tÕ kinhtÕn kinhtÕn ØpÕ toà kinhtikoà), and there is no
motion apart from things (Physics III.1, 200b29-33).24

On the basis of the preceding passages, it is difficult to deny the correlated character of the
subjects involved in the processes of poiein and paschein. If it is true that the subjects involved in
poiein and paschein are correlatives, then we have good reason to infer that the processes in
which they are engaged, i.e. poiein and paschein, are correlatives themselves and can, thus, be
consolidated into the category of relation.25

2 (b) Unification: poiein and paschein and the genus of motion or activity
Although the preceding section offers ample evidence for the consolidation of poiein and
paschein in the category of relation, we may wonder whether this unification does justice to the
specific role that poiein and paschein play within Aristotle‘s oeuvre. Building upon another
suggestion of Plotinus,26 the genus that could unify both poiein and paschein is motion or activity
broadly speaking, including both kinēsis and energeia, and praxis and poiēsis, but also alloiōsis,

24

Slightly modified translation. Unless noted otherwise, we will use Sachs‘ translation of the Physics: Aristotle,
Aristotle’s Physics; A Guided Study, translated and annotated by J. Sachs, New Brunswick/London: Rutgers
University Press, 1995.
25
Cf. Trendelenburg, 1864 [1963], p. 131.
26
Plotinus was presumably not the first one to make this suggestion. Cf. S. Strange, 1992, footnote 504. ―Some
critics had already argued before the time of Boethus that poiein and paschein belonged to a single category, that of
change (kinēsis), cf. Simplicius, 63, 6-9 and 303, 5-16. They were followed by Plotinus (Enn. VI.1.11 and VI. 3.28)
and perhaps earlier by Galen (Institutio Logica 13,9).‖ Cf. also Simplicius, 2003, 62, 24 and 66, 16-67,8. Dexippus
also raises this issue, see his commentary on Aristotle‘s Categories 30, 35-31,3, and he offers possible answers in
response to this issue in 31, 3-10 (Dexippus, On Aristotle Categories, translated by J. Dillon, London: Duckworth,
1990), which we will discuss later. Cf. also Trendelenburg, 1864 [1963], p. 132.
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metabolē, genēsis and phthora, et cetera.27 While it is true that the unification of poiein and
paschein within the category of motion broadly speaking is of a different kind than the
unification entailed by pros ti, the model of unification as proposed here builds upon the
dialectical relationship between poiein and paschein as established in the previous section, and
simultaneously shows how this dialectic between poiein and paschein plays itself out in the
generic field of motion and activity.
Plotinus‘ suggestion that poiein and paschein could be unified in a category such as
motion and activity finds support in the following argument. If (1) we take seriously the claims
following from our reading of the Categories that poiein and paschein address active and passive
motions referred to by verbs such as ―burning‖ and ―cutting‖, and if (2), in addition, poiein and
paschein signify physical processes between contraries as GC shows, then (3) we have sufficient
evidence to prove that poiein and paschein are, in fact, ways of explaining motion.
The advantage of unifying poiein and paschein in the genus of motion and activity
broadly speaking is that it does justice to the scope of meaning within which we have seen poiein
and paschein function so far: that of categories signifying motion and activity, and that of
principles of physical, elemental, change. Moreover, the inclusion of poiein and paschein in the
genus of motion or activity proverbially kills two birds with one stone: it allows us both to
capture the specific scope of meaning of poiein and paschein, and to speak of the correlated
character of poiein and paschein, which is so integral to these two concepts. For, as Physics III
clarifies, motion (kinēsis) has two components – that which moves and that which is moved –

27

Within Aristotle‘s analysis of poiein and paschein we do not encounter specific tools to distinguish those different
kinds of movement. For instance, although Aristotle‘s analysis in GC I.6 and I.7 initially seems to suggest that poiein
and paschein are to be restricted to qualitative change (alloiōsis), his association of poiein and paschein with
substantial change (namely as elemental transformation) (e.g. GC II.4, 331a7-16) prompts us to abandon this
perspective.

9

and both are in relation to (prÕj ti) one another (Physics III.1, 200b29). As Aristotle writes:
―what moves is a mover of something moved, and what is moved is moved by something moving
it‖ (Physics III.1, 200b32-34). To explain his two-pronged approach to motion in terms of mover
and moved, Aristotle explicitly calls for an analogy between the pair poiein-paschein and kineinkineisthai. Subsequently, in Physics III.3, Aristotle appeals to poiein and paschein to explain how
the process of motion may involve two components whose activities (energeiai) are nonetheless
one and the same.28
More evidence for the consolidation of poiein and paschein in the category of motion and
activity can be found in Aristotle‘s discussion of the activity of sense-perception in De Anima
II.5. There Aristotle asserts that our senses ―produce (poiein) no sensation (poioàsin a‡sqhsin)
apart from external objects‖ (DA II.5, 417a4-5). It is only through ―being acted upon (paschein)
and being moved (kineisthai) by something capable of acting (poiētikou) and being active‖29 (DA
II.5, 417a18) that our senses come to exercise their activity. This means that an activity
(energeia) such as sense-perception is fundamentally dependent upon both the ―active‖ activity
(poiein) of the perceptible objects and the ―passive‖ activity (paschein) of the sense-organs. Very
similar to his ideas in Physics III, here Aristotle arrives at the conclusion that ―the activity of the
sensible object and the activity of the sense-faculty are one and the same‖ (DA III.2, 425b26, our
italics). In other words, while dependent upon both poiein and paschein, perception is in fact a
single, unified activity.

28

Many scholars question what this identity is. Cf. M.L. Gill, ―Aristotle‘s Theory of Causal Action in Physics III.3,‖
in: Phronesis 25 (3), 1980 (pp. 129-147), pp. 140 ff.; cf. E. Hussey‘s notes to Aristotle’s Physics, Books III and IV,
translated with notes by E. Hussey, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, p. 67. According to Aquinas, the unity that
Aristotle speaks of here is being one and the same ―in things‖ (lecture 5, 317), i.e. ―in subject‖ (lecture 5, 318) but
―not one and the same according to reason‖ (lecture 5, 318): St. T. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics,
translated by R.J. Blackwell, R.J. Spath & W.E. Thirlkel, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963.
29
This translation is our own.
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Briefly, what we can conclude from Physics III.3 and DA II. 5 and III.2 is that Aristotle
explicitly uses the language of poiein and paschein to elucidate the ―active‖ and ―passive‖ factors
involved in motion and activity, thereby offering further evidence for the unification of poiein
and paschein in the category of motion and activity without sacrificing their correlated
character.30
Despite the above evidence however, integrating poiein and paschein in the genus of
motion or activity overlooks one crucial fact: poiein and paschein do not only refer to the
processes of ―active‖ and ―passive‖ motion or activity respectively, but also to the causes of
―active‖ and ―passive‖ motion or activity. The following section will focus specifically on this
causative aspect of poiein and paschein, which will complicate an all-too-easy reduction of
poiein and paschein to one category.

3. Distinction: poiein, paschein and causation
The reduction of poiein and paschein to one, more basic concept is problematic insofar as
poiein and paschein do not only acquire meaning through reference to one another, but also have
a certain sense of independence. What lies ―below‖ the layer of correlated motions and activities
is the unmistakable fact that poiein and paschein signify the different active and passive causes
that make those processes possible. For instance, poiein does not only refer to the active process
of heating, but also points to the role of the thing in question (e.g. fire) that brings about this

30

The exclusive focus in this section on poiein and paschein as categories unified by motion does not exclude that
other categories, such as quality and quantity and substance, may involve motion or change as well. Cf. Reale‘s
analysis of how being as potency and being as act cut across all categories (Reale, 1990, p. 275). What we are
arguing for is that Aristotle‘s description of the categories poiein and paschein comes closest to explicitly analyzing
movement or activity, and specifically the different sources of movement or activity.

11

change. Similarly, paschein may imply the process of being heated, but also the underlying
susceptibility of the substrate to be heated (e.g. the flammable nature of wood).
GC I.7 offers evidence that including these underlying causative factors is indispensable
to gaining full comprehension of poiein and paschein:

For sometimes it is the substratum (Øpoke…menon) which we speak of as acted upon
(p£scein) as when we say that the human being is cured (Øgi£zesqai) or heated
(qerma…nesqai) or chilled (yÚchesqai) or any other things of this kind; sometimes,
though, we say that what is cold (to yucrÒn) is heated (qerma…nesqai), what is ill (to
k£mnon) is cured (Øgi£zesqai). And both are true – the same thing happens in the case of
the agent (tÕ poioàntoj): sometimes it is the human being that we say heats, sometimes
we say that what is hot (to qermÒn) heats – for there is a sense in which it is the matter (¹
Ûlh) that is acted upon (p£scei) and another sense in which it is the contrary (GC I.7,
324a16-23).31

As this passage indicates, there are two modes of addressing change. One view, reflected in one
mode of speaking, pays attention to the subject that acts and the underlying substrate that is acted
upon; the other focuses on the qualitative opposites that act and are acted upon.32 By including

31

This translation is a mixture of Forster‘s (Aristotle, On Coming-to-be and Passing-away, translated by E.S.
Forster, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) and Williams‘ translations (Aristotle, De Generatione et
Corruptione, translated by C.J.F. Williams, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) with some of our own modifications. It
is noteworthy how consistent Aristotle is in using active verbal voices to indicate poiein, and passive verbal voices to
indicate paschein. Cf. also Wildberg, 2004, p. 233.
32
In Physics I.7, Aristotle contends that it is impossible for contraries to be acted upon by another (Physics I.7
190b33, our emphasis). Instead, Aristotle argues there for a ―third‖ thing that is involved in ―natural coming into
being‖ (191a4ff), namely something that ―underlies‖ the contraries (I.7 191a19). Sachs comments: ―But bare
opposites such as white and not-white cannot turn into each other; some underlying thing that had one of the
opposites in it comes to have the other in it‖ (Aristotle’s Physics: A Guided Study, translated by J. Sachs, New
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the subject and the substrate of change33 in his analysis, Aristotle provides more insight into
poiein and paschein. In the case of poiein, the initiating cause of change34 (for example, a human
being who is heating something) may be associated with poiein, but also the qualitative contrary
(e.g. the hot) that acts. When we speak of paschein, we could point to the underlying material
substrate (e.g. a stone is being heated, but also to the affected quality (e.g. the cold). In other
words, when addressing poiein, the initiating cause of the form of change demands recognition as
much as the (contrary) quality that is brought about. Similarly, while addressing paschein, we
should acknowledge the matter – the fundamental material cause that enables a subject to be
prone to be affected – as much as the contrary quality that is affected.
Thus, there are different ways of explaining the processes of poiein and paschein. Poiein
pertains both to the agent (as the carrier and possessor of a certain form) and the form itself, i.e.
the quality in question, which is one member of a pair of opposites. Correspondingly, paschein
pertains both to the patient as the carrier and possessor which allows for a change in quality, i.e.,
matter, and to the affected quality itself. The following passage from GC II.9 explicitly connects
being affected (paschein) and being moved (kineisthai) to matter, but also links acting (poiein)
and moving (kinein) to ―another power,‖ presumably the source of motion which carries a
particular form:

Brunswick/London: Rutgers University Press, 1998, p.48). When we address change, we cannot do so by solely
referring to the extremes within which the change takes place. We also have to take into account that which is
changing: the substrate.
33
Wildberg speaks of the ―carriers of the quality‖ (Wildberg, 2004, p. 234).
34
Cf. Physics II.3, 194b29-33.
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For it belongs to matter (Ülhj) to be affected (p£scein) and be moved (kine‹sqai), it
belongs to another power (˜tšraj dun£mewj) to move (kine‹n) and act (poie‹n) (GC II.9,
335b29-31).35

Through the inclusion of form and matter in the analysis of poiein and paschein, our
earlier comprehension of poiein and paschein as mere correlatives or contraries unified by a
common genus encounters serious difficulties. If paschein is indeed also characteristic of matter,
and if poiein also belongs to form, we need to reassess the issue of the identity and difference of
poiein and paschein. More specifically, it appears that, because of their association with form and
matter, the meanings of poiein and paschein need to be distinguished, and their independence
needs to be reinstated. For, as causative principles, both form and matter have a certain sense of
independence. That even matter has a particular kind of independence can be retrieved from
Physics I.9, where Aristotle ascertains that matter is ―almost, and in a certain respect is, an ousia,
which the deprivation is not at all‖ (Physics I.9 192a5-9). The next section of our paper will
elaborate on the issue of the dependence and independence of the two categories of poiein and
paschein.36

35

Modified translation. Williams translates: ―For it is the property of matter to be acted upon and to be moved,
whereas causing movement and acting belong to another capacity‖ (Williams, 1982; our italics). Williams‘
translation of ‗property‘ may weaken the actual meaning expressed by the genitive of possession used to indicate the
relationship between matter and paschein and kineisthai. Forster‘s translation renders the genitive of possession
construction in the following way: ―for to be acted upon, that is, to be moved, is characteristic of matter, but to
move, that is, to act, is the function of another power‖ (Forster, 1965; our italics).
36
This raises the interesting question of what the consequences are of this ‗causal‘ reading of poiein and paschein for
understanding a work such as the Categories, which is presumably ‗innocent‘ on the topic of the matter-form
distinction. Unfortunately, this discussion falls outside the parameters of this paper.
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4. Poiein and paschein: identity and difference revisited
Dexippus37 and Simplicius38 both offer thoughtful responses to the issue of the
dependence and independence of poiein and paschein. In Dexippus‘ view, poiein and paschein
can be part of one and the same event, but are ultimately different in being. Poiein and paschein
cannot be reduced to each other: ―neither is that which acts, insofar as it acts, acted upon, nor
does that which is acted upon, in so far as it is acted upon, act.‖39 For instance, when X heats Y,
X is not heated by Y insofar as it heats Y and when Y is heated by X, Y does not heat X insofar
as it is heated by X. X and Y play different roles in each process of poiein and paschein. In
principle, poiein and paschein have distinct natures: e.g. heating, although accompanied by being
heated, is not being heated, it principally refers to the action of that which confers heating.
Similarly, being heated is not the same as heating. Although food, in order to be heated, requires
a source of heating, the process of being heated has a different meaning than that of heating.
Even in composite entities, Dexippus writes, the two processes do not ―come together
(sunšrcetai),‖ although the two principles (¥rcai) ―show confluence (sump…ptein) into the
same place.‖40

37

In the introduction to Dexippus‘ commentary On Aristotle Categories, John Dillon writes that Dexippus‘
commentary offers ―a boiled-down version of the results of Porphyry‘s erudition, probably largely mediated through
Iamblichus‖ (Dillon, 1990, p.11). In Simplicius‘ view, Dexippus added almost nothing himself to the work of
Porphyry and Iamblichus (Dillon, 1990, p.11). Nonetheless, ―Dexippus, then, is of interest both as a surviving
testimony to the great achievement of Porphyry in turning aside Plotinus‘ rejection of Aristotle‘s Categories and as
partial evidence for the content of Iamblichus‘ commentary‖ (Dillon, 1990, p.12).
38
Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories 9-15, 2000; Simplicius, in his commentary to the Categories, retrieves
Aristotle‘s writings in a way that is appropriate to his own purposes, although this is not solely the case (e.g. Gaskin,
2000, p. 3). He devotes forty pages to poiein and paschein. For him, the stakes are high. In order to show the
different levels of reality emanating from the one, he needs to clarify the status of poiein and paschein, and to prove
that ―Aristotelian categories have an application beyond the sensible world, to the mind and intellect, and even to the
One itself‖ (Gaskin, 2000, p.2). Cf. also N. Vamvoukakis, ―Les catégories aristotéliciennes d‘action et de passion
vues par Simplicius,‖ in: Aubenque, P. (ed.) Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique, Paris: J. Vrin, 1980 (pp.
253-270), p. 254.
39
Dexippus, 1990, 31, 2-4.
40
Dexippus, 1990, 31, 4-6. As different principles, poiein and paschein thus coincide (sympiptein), but do not come
together (synerchein).

15

Simplicius argues in a similar fashion, separating the activities of the agent and the
patient: ―the agent does not undergo qua agent, nor the patient act qua patient‖41 and ―the agent
insofar as it acts and possesses pure operation is not moved at all.‖42 Vamvoukakis renders
Simplicius‘ reading of poiein and paschein in the following way: ―these two categories do not
have their own being within their mutual relationship, as is the case with the left and right or the
‗up‘ and the ‗below;‘ the agent and the patient each produces its proper work (oeuvre), the one
qua agent, the other qua patient.‖43 Said differently, there is a significant disparity between
concepts such as left and right which are merely correlatives and do not have meaning without
reference to each other, and the concepts of poiein and paschein, which refer to each other but
also have their own distinct sphere of meaning.
The fact that the patient provides the occasion and necessary condition for an action does
not diminish the relevance of action, or, as Vamvoukakis expresses it, the ―ontological content of
the action.‖44 This equally applies to the patient: although dependent upon the agent, its being ―is
not entirely dependent upon the action of the agent.‖45 In other words, the patient has a certain
being ―that is proper to it.‖46 Vamvoukakis gives the example of a statue made of brass: ―the
cause of the passion of the brass, for example, is not only the sculptor, i.e., an external cause to it
[the brass], but the brass itself: it is precisely because the brass is susceptible to being
transformed into a statue (and this ―susceptibility‖ is uniquely due to its being insofar as it is
brass) that it provides the sculptor with the possibility of exercising his action.‖47 To use

41

Simplicius, 2000, 312, 10-11.
Simplicius, 2000, 313, 9-10.
43
Vamvoukakis, 1980, p. 256; cf. Simplicius, 2000, 299, 4-5.
44
Vamvoukakis, 1980, p. 262.
45
Vamvoukakis, 1980, p. 263.
46
Vamvoukakis, 1980, p. 263.
47
Vamvoukakis, 1980, p. 263.
42
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Aristotle‘s example of medicinal food acting upon the ill patient (GC I.7, 324b1-3), the
possibility of the patient‘s healing is due to his susceptibility to be transformed by the food, and
this susceptibility is not due to an external cause, but to his own body. Dexippus concludes by
saying that Aristotle distinguishes poiein and paschein ―in accordance with his views on causal
principles.‖48 Although a process of change appears to be one and continuous, this change is due
to different causes that converge in one and the same place.
Hence, Dexippus and Simplicius offer reasonable grounds for pulling the meanings of
poiein and paschein apart, and for establishing their independence from each other. When
considering poiein and paschein as representative of different causal principles, their
classification as two distinct categories is sensible as it affirms Aristotle‘s statement that the
categories ―have different things primarily underlying them, which cannot be reduced one to the
other or both to the same thing‖ (Metaphysics V.28, 1024b10-13).
Yet, both poiein and paschein remain dependent upon one another and derive their
identity in part from this dependence: in its interwovenness with matter (hylē), paschein does
have its own sphere and responsibility, but remains ultimately dependent upon a particular kind
of poiein that sets it into motion. It cannot create its own form or eidos – this ―radical
incapacity‖49 is immanent to it. Moreover, when not governed by form, matter in the form of
katamoenia obstructs nature,50 giving rise to monsters (Generation of Animals IV.4, 770b15-17).
By contrast, it seems that the poiein expressed by an agent is more independent than a patient‘s
paschein, since the agent can at least create its own eidos. However, the poiein of an agent also

48

Dexippus, 1990, 31, 8-10.
Vamvoukakis, 1980, p. 265.
50
Ibid.
49
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remains dependent upon a particular paschein. For example, without the occasion provided by
the wood, the woodworker‘s artwork could not come into being.
Thus, it can be established that what is central to the relationship between poiein and
paschein is a tension between identity and difference.51 As antonyms and correlatives, poiein and
paschein‘s difference remains tied to the identity in genus that they share: each is to be
understood through the other. Yet, what complicates a complete collapse of the two categories
into one is their connection to the framework of causation. If we take this causal aspect of poiein
and paschein seriously, then we have to contest the claim that poiein and paschein can be
collapsed into one another as if they formed one concept and instead have to emphasize their
difference. For, if it is the case that hylē is interwoven with paschein, and if hylē ―is almost, or is,
an ousia‖ (Physics I.9, 192a5-9), then paschein has a certain independence.52 Similarly, the
activity of form, poiein, is to be understood on its own terms, as the movements and activities of
the first mover and first agent as described by Aristotle indicate.

5. Poiein and paschein: the irresolvable tension between identity and difference
To comprehend the relationship between poiein and paschein more fully we propose to
see their relationship in terms of a dynamic of attraction and repulsion. Insofar as they are to be
understood through one another, their mutual co-dependence attracts them so much to one
another that they seem to unify. The attraction pulling together poiein and paschein is most
clearly visible in correlated processes such as burning and being burned, or cutting and being cut.

51

In his paper ―Aristotle and Passivity,‖ Stefano Franchi showed the tension between two different conceptions of
―passivity:‖ ―the relational view‖ and the ―receptive view‖ (Franchi, ―Aristotle and Passivity,‖ APA Central Division
Presentation, 2004, p.6). Our paper also, in part, takes up this issue of tension, but more broadly with regard to the
relation between the categories of poiein and paschein.
52
Cf. Vamvoukakis, 1980, p.263.
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The fact that processes such as these can only function in conjunction and correlation with each
other indicates that the mutual attraction between poiein or paschein is so strong that it prevents
either of them of having self-subsistence or identity outside of their relationship.
Nevertheless, the relationship between poiein and paschein is also marked by repulsion
since the two concepts sometimes appear to be so opposed to each other so as to repel each other
and assert their distinction from each other. The repulsion causing the two concepts to separate
manifests itself most clearly where poiein and paschein designate ‗active‘ and ‗passive‘ causality
respectively. For, contrary to correlatives such as left and right whose meaning is solely
dependent upon each other, poiein and paschein each have their own sphere of meaning, such as
becomes visible in the ‗active‘ activity associated with form and the ‗passive‘ activity associated
with matter. Although interdependent, the poiein of form and the paschein of matter are
emphatically different. In stressing their own sphere of meaning, poiein and paschein exclude the
other from itself, and thereby repulse one another, leading the concepts to separate.
Yet, as causes who often work in conjunction, poiein and paschein also remain tied to
each other, which prevents them from separating completely. It is for this reason that the dynamic
of attraction and repulsion is particularly well-suited to explain the relationship between poiein
and paschein, because it (a) grasps this relationship in terms of an ongoing process, (b) elucidates
the grounds for the dual movements of unification and distinction, (c) accounts for the dialectical
tension that exists between those two movements, and (d) emphasizes that, no matter how far the
repulsion extends, poiein and paschein are still attracted and correlated to each other. In short,
the dynamic of attraction and repulsion allows us to acknowledge each concept‘s proper function
and autonomy, while also recognizing the co-dependence between the concepts that inevitably
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attracts them to one another. In other words, attraction and repulsion allow us to explain poiein‘s
and paschein‘s incorporation of each other, without conflating them or overlooking their
respective independence.
The tension between attraction and repulsion can be explicitly retrieved on the basis of
Physics III.3. Aristotle argues here that acting and being acted upon belong to the same
movement, but are fundamentally different in being (einai) (III.3, 202b10). He states: ―acting is
not the same as being acted upon, but that to which these belong, the motion, is the same‖
(Physics III.3, 202b24). This demonstrates that poiein and paschein remain committed to each
other and converge with one another so as to make motion possible, but are simultaneously
utterly distinct from one another qua causative principles and beings. In addition, Metaphysics
IX.1 argues that the potentiality for poiein and paschein is in a way one, and in a way distinct
(Meta IX.1, 1046a19-22) thereby enforcing the idea that the tension between identity and
distinction is at the root of Aristotle‘s understanding of these two concepts.53
In closing, we argue that at the core of the relationship between poiein and paschein is a
dynamic between attraction and repulsion, caused by mutual dependence and irrevocable
difference. The relationship between these concepts thereby comes to epitomize what is at the

53

A further exploration of the tension between poiein and paschein can be found in Stoic thought in the concept of
tension or tonos. For Chrysippus, tonos or tensional movement (tonikē kinēsis) is associated with breath or pneuma.
The pneumatic or tensional movement gives stability to all things in the kosmos, both animate and inanimate: ―The
inward movement or movement toward the center holds the body together and produces cohesion and unity, and
being; the outwards movement or movement toward the periphery causes dimensions and qualities.‖ (D.E. Hahm,
The Origins of Stoic Cosmology, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977, p. 166.) Hahn is here referring to
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 2.451, 452, 551. The tension between the movement inward and the movement
outward (which happen simultaneously) makes things both unified and distinct from other beings. We could argue
that we find some anticipation of this concept of tonos in Aristotle‘s thinking about poiein and paschein. What the
Stoics call outward motion is the movement of repulsion that pushes poiein and paschein away from each other into
their own distinct domain of beings; what the Stoics call inward motion is the movement of attraction that unifies
poiein and paschein. Poiein and paschein cannot be identified without appealing to both movements. Without the
tension between these two movements, poiein and paschein cannot emerge as the fascinating – distinct yet unified –
concepts that they are.

20

essence of any motion or activity: a dynamic convergence and divergence of active and passive
causal factors.

Epilogue
Whereas we have examined the concepts of poiein and paschein so far in rather narrowly
defined contexts such as the Categories and On Generation and Corruption, there are many
more places in Aristotle‘s oeuvre where the significance of poiein and paschein needs to be
recovered. One of these works is the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle explicitly shows
interest in these concepts, as indicated by the following sections:

For excellence consists rather in acting well (eâ poie‹n) than in being acted upon well (eâ
p£scein) to one (EN IV.1, 1120a13).

A courageous person is acted upon (p£scei) and acts (pr£ttei) according to the merits
of the circumstances and as logos guides them (EN III.7, 1115b19-21).54

As these passages highlight, Aristotle‘s approach to the issue of virtue (EN IV.1) and to a specific
virtue such as courage (EN III.7) consists of taking into consideration both ―active‖ activity
(poiein or prattein) and ―passive‖ activity (paschein). This remarkable facet of Aristotle‘s
thinking, to take into consideration in his ethics the role of the ―patient‖ and the idea of being
acted upon well indicates that the current reappraisal of Aristotle‘s ethics and his general ideas on
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movement cannot be complete if they discuss action and agency alone, but have to include
Aristotle‘s ideas on suffering and patiency as well.
Although one of the above quotes from the Nicomachean Ethics also seems to show that
Aristotle favors ―active‖ activity above ―passive‖ activity, an understanding of motion or activity
in Aristotle‘s ethics is incomplete without a discussion of ―passive‖ motion or activity. By
acknowledging the fact that, for Aristotle, an agent is a patient as well, we acquire a more holistic
view of the metaphysical, physical, and ethical world as Aristotle must have considered it –
where agents are never considered as autonomous, but always engaged in interactions with other
beings and forces of different kinds. Thus, this research of poiein and paschein implies that we
need to revise our image of the ideal human agent of Aristotle‘s ethics, and thus our concept of
virtue.
Whereas we, modern readers of Aristotle, might tend to perceive ethical agents from a
rather autonomous point of view, the ideal, virtuous, human agent of Aristotle‘s ethics is both a
good agent and a good patient, i.e. a being in full interaction in the polis, acting properly in
response to people, political events, emotions or affections (pathē), et cetera. Thus, the concept
of virtue entails both acting well and being acted upon well. Moreover, the ideal human agent of
Aristotle‘s ethics is a being who acts properly in response to the way he or she has been set in
motion by the first mover, i.e. the divine (cf. Metaphysics XII.7, 1072b3-4). Thus, the
investigation of poiein and paschein given here may provide us with a new impetus to recover
the important interaction between ―active‖ activity and ―passive‖ activity as it comes to the fore
in Aristotle‘s ethics.

54

This translation is our own.
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